Distraction tactics in Venezuela

From Rayma

Politics has often been called "the art of the possible," but what does that really mean? What is possible to accomplish? What is possible to hide? What is possible to obscure? Like most things in life, it is not just one of the aforementioned, rather an amalgamation of the three, with other factors most certainly contributing as well.

The final of the three has intrigued me very much as of late, given the events in Venezuela. Love him or hate him, Chavez is quite good at distracting not only the Venezuelan people, but also the international community. One needn't look farther than the infamous Por que no te callas? incident in Santiago de Chile last weekend. Rather than go through that all over again, I feel like it's more useful to look at two other recent incidents which have gone overlooked by much of the media: a proposed solution to the border dispute in the Gulf of Venezuela; and the incursion by the Venezuelan military to Guyana.


Border dispute with Colombia
This is not new news at all, but it seems to be making headlines at a very opportune time for Chavez. The problem over this border has been around since 1902 with the signing of the Acta de Castilletes. My initial reaction was that the latest appearance of a century-old dispute had to do with hydrocarbons and oil. Many Colombian friends of mine, particularly those who are from the border area, have long asserted that Venezuela is stealing Colombian oil. That doesn't sit too well at all with the Colombians, this information --rumor that is may be-- is disconcerting, in terms of violating sovereign territorial boundaries on top of stealing a lucrative natural resource. As I previously mentioned, I was --and still am-- in agreement with Garrido in that this issue is being used to get Venezuelans hyped up about something else other than the constitutional reform. (When I wrote this, the student protests hadn't escalated to the degree to which they reached at the end of October.)


Military incursion on Guyana
There has been a great deal of mystery surrounding the attack allegedly perpetrated by Venezuelan military in Guyana. Venezuela denies that it happens; first steps to resolve the issue are said to be taking place between the two countries. This is a difficult situation for both countries, as the territory in which the supposed incursion occurred is disputed. Julia explains the early history of the interaction between the two territorial entities during the early 19th century when the colonies were fighting for their independence, and Daniel discusses the politics behind the addition of the eighth star to the flag, directly related to Guyana. Given that the circumstances under which this happened, people will probe into the issue, and many will defend their country out of a sense of patriotism and pride. Given that this is a sore, open wound for many, I suspect that when both countries reach an accord, there will be griping on both sides. Why is this important to consider? Once again, people will become absorbed in this, as many would consider it an issue which challenges the border, and thus the sovereignty, of their country. In paying attention to this, it detracts attention from the reform, the food shortages, the government's lack of tolerance toward SIP, Chavez's increasingly bellicose rhetoric regarding oil, and the desire to develop nuclear technology.

Now, from what else do these border issues distract? The humanitarian exchange to be realized between the Colombian government and the FARC terrorists. Colombians have been divided on this topic; some feel that the negotiation is good, in that FARC will have a chance to prove itself to be trustworthy, with a more long-term goal being that they will become a formal political actor; others have condemned this mediation as a way in which the FARC will make lofty promises without fulfilling their end of the bargain, as their past track record, coupled with the way they have viciously affected thousands of Colombian families, leaves much to be desired.

My personal feeling on this? Chavez needs to at least try to get back on the good side of the Colombian government. Thus far, we've seen him freely gallivant with members of the FARC --without clearing the meeting with Uribe, who set the terms under which meetings would be carried out-- and assure the public that he knows where captive Ingrid Betancourt is, and yet we've yet to have concrete results. On a more global scale, there are also significant implications: a large sector of the population still has its doubts regarding the sheer plausibility of the exchange, and with good reason, as the FARC continue to attack the Colombian military. Also, Venezuela continues to build up its military and has expressed its desire for nuclear technology, both of which are extraordinarily worrying, given the recent behavior of Chavez in the international arena. If one invests a great deal of time and energy, and is focused on a more benign topic --relatively speaking, as I can assure you that the prospect of Venezuelan territory to Colombia is hardly benign for Venezuelans or Colombians-- it is quite likely that he will miss the gravity of other events which will bring more significant consequences. The fact that he is also working with international actors, such as French president Sarkozy, builds up his credibility in the international community. My main reservation --as a Colombian-American-- is the following: Chavez has played such a smart game with this, that Uribe will end up looking bad, whatever the outcome is. If the exchange is successful, Chavez gets the praise as a miracle mediator, winning the admiration of many, particularly the Left. (This I never understood; Chavez has been in cahoots with the FARC in western Venezuela and eastern Colombia, allowing them to pass across the border unchecked. Close ties to a notorious terrorist organization is hardly admirable, and yet, people find it so.) Also, questions will arise as to why Uribe waited so long in asking Chavez to serve as a mediator. If the exchange is unsuccessful, Uribe will inevitably be criticized for having postponed the meetings with the FARC for such a long time, with the headlong logic of, "If you had only acted more quickly, we might have gotten the hostages back."

Final impressions
It certainly seems plausible that these latest actions are similar to the way in which Argentina approached its war over Las Malvinas (aka The Falkland Islands): a last-ditch attempt to not only distract the Argentine people from their internal (economic) problems but also to try to restore national pride. With the rapidly approaching referendum on the 69 proposed constitutional reforms set to be held on 2 December, to pull the Venezuelan people away from the nature of the reforms by occupying them with other topics. While it seems that progress is being made, as chavista students agreed to debate opposition students, it may be too little, too late. Also, the culture of fear in the wake of the Tascon list/Maisanta database from the 2004 recall referendum, coupled with many people unwilling to cast their vote as they see it as a losing battle which will just formalize their fear of a dictatorship, may indeed prevent those whose sympathies would make them vote "no" if they themselves were willing to do so.